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Abstract
Traditional access control mechanisms aim to prevent illegal actions a-priori occur-
rence, i.e. before granting a request for a document. There are scenarios however
where the security decision can not be made on the fly. For these settings we devel-
oped a language and a framework for a-posteriori access control. In this paper we
show how the framework can be used in a practical scenario. In particular, we work
out the example of an Electronic Health Record (EHR) system, we outline the full
architecture needed for audit-based access control and we discuss the requirements
and limitations of this approach concerning the underlying infrastructure and its
users.
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1 Introduction
Increasingly often, sensitive data needs to be accessed and exchanged across
complex and distributed computer systems. To protect data confidentiality,
numerous distributed access control mechanisms have been developed. Typi-
cally, these systems try to prevent illegitimate actions before their occurrence,
by deciding on the fly if access should be granted or not.
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To see why sometimes a different approach is needed, consider the specific
issue of the modernization of health care systems. Roughly, Electronic Health
Record (EHR) systems must fulfill two requirements [16]: (1) To provide
high-quality health care, the EHR must be immediately available, preferably
across the boundaries of the different hospitals and abroad. (2) To protect the
patient’s privacy, the EHR must remain confidential and should be disclosed
only according to the law and/or the patient’s explicit consent. The latter
requirement is particularly important in a country such as The Netherlands,
where medical insurances are privatized and the patients’ medical data is
worth millions.
Note that fulfilling both requirements is hard. To fulfill the first require-
ment, the mechanism should be relatively simple and fast. The second re-
quirement however states that access should only be granted under precise
conditions and circumstances. Considering the complexity of the medical work
flow, the large number of health records and the variety of institutions, users
and systems involved, it seems likely that checking these circumstances and
conditions is slow and prone to errors.
Besides the problem of designing a fast access control mechanism that at
the same time takes into account complex conditions [1,3,8], it is considered
impossible, in general, to design an access control mechanism that models
every circumstance perfectly [11]; in other words, there are always exceptional,
unforeseen circumstances. This is an important issue in the EHR setting, given
the mobility of patients and staff, and the urgency of health care. We believe
that at least it should be possible for medical staff to self-authorize exceptions
to rules, while leaving the process of justifying the exceptions for later.
In this paper we show how the Audit Logic [4,7], an a-posteriori access con-
trol framework, can be used in the EHR setting. In the Audit Logic framework,
a-priori access control is minimized to the mere authentication of users and
objects, and their basic authorizations. More complex security procedures are
performed in an a-posteriori auditing mechanism. Here we formalize a sce-
nario involving medical personnel and health records to show how this access
control mechanism works in practice. Finally we discuss the main advantages
and drawbacks of using an a-posteriori access control mechanism rather than
a preventive one in the specific EHR scenario.
Related work
The Cassandra system [3] was designed to implement an a-priori access
control mechanism in an EHR system. The authors test the expressivity of
the Cassandra policy language by expressing existing policies regarding access
to medical data and activation of medical roles. The policy languages used in
the Cassandra system are different flavors of Datalog with constraints. While
Cassandra’s policy language is in theory undecidable, it is argued that this
is not problematic in practice. On the other hand, the Audit Logic policy
language that we use is not based on Datalog, but on a fragment of first-order
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logic [5] (which is semi-decidable).
Rissanen et al. [11] address the issue of how to override safely the decisions
of a preventive access control system called the Privilege Calculus. At each
override a procedure starts to find the appropriate authority which is notified
to audit the override. In our approach there is only a minimal preventive access
control mechanism, which can not be overriden. Moreover, in our approach it
is up to the auditors to decide when and which users to audit.
The policy language used in our framework is most closely related to
Binder [1]. In Binder delegation is also modeled with the says predicate,
which, however, may not be nested inside another says predicate, to keep
the language decidable. This restriction is absent in the Audit Logic, and it
was shown that the corresponding logic is semi-decidable [5]. Halpern and
Weissman [8] also use first-order logic to model security policies. Their set-
ting is centralized and they do not consider a special connective to express
delegations.
A related problem is the enforcement of copyrights in content-sharing sys-
tems (DRM). It has been argued that DRM can be used to enforce privacy
policies. For instance, Conrado et al. [6] propose to use DRM to enable privacy
in content-sharing systems and vice versa to use privacy as a driver for a wider
use of DRM enabled devices. DRM however, unlike the Audit Logic, requires
special (compliant) hardware or software at the application layer. This makes
DRM unsuitable for EHR systems or enterprise-privacy systems.
In the context of DRM, a type of a-posteriori access control was proposed
by Shmatikov and Talcott [14]. There, a reputation-based trust management
(TM) model is presented, in which the reputation of individual agents is de-
termined by the fulfilment or violation of (DRM) licenses. We believe that
Trust Management [10], coupled with auditing, may be an interesting solution,
especially in large distributed EHR systems.
The justification proofs in the Audit Logic framework are based on a for-
mal logic. A number of distributed access control models are based on formal
logics (see the survey by Abadi [1]). In these models an authorization request
or an authentication credential corresponds to a logical formula and the au-
thorization or authentication decision corresponds to a proof of the formula.
In the PCA framework [2], proposed by Appel and Felten, higher-order logic
proofs are generated by the clients, proving that they have the authorization
to access webservers. The undecidability of proof finding in higher order logic
is not a problem in their setting, because it is the user’s task to find the proofs.
A similar construction is used in the Audit Logic, where users show auditors
that they are accountable by submitting formal proofs, that can be checked
automatically.
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2 Architecture
In this section we recapitulate the main definitions of the Audit Logic. We
refer to earlier work for a more complete description [4].
Policies and Actions
The framework is based on a group of agents executing actions, that can
be audited to check whether their actions comply with the relevant (privacy)
policies. Actions are modeled by a set of predicates Act. The basic set of
actions contains comm(a, b, φ) and creates(a, d): creates(a, d) represents the
creation of a piece of data d by agent a, while comm(a, b, φ) denotes the com-
munication of policy φ from agent a to agent b. By communicating policies
agents delegate rights to other agents to execute certain actions. In addition
to the basic actions, there may be scenario-specific actions such as read(a, d),
expressing the action of a reading d, or giveDrug(a, b, c), expressing that a ad-
ministers b a drug c. Policies are built using a set of atomic predicates, which
can be either permissions, or conditions. The basic permission is owns(a, d)
expressing that a owns d. Additionally, one may have scenario-specific pred-
icates such as mayRead(a, d), expressing the permission that a may execute
the reads action on d, or the condition isNurse(a), expressing that agent a is
a nurse. Complex policies are built from permissions and conditions using
logical connectives. The grammar of the policy language is [4]:
φ ::=φ ∧ φ | ∀o. φ | φ→ φ | a says φ to b | !α→ φ | ?α→ φ |
::= p(o1, ..., on)| a owns d | >.
Here o are objects or variables of the appropriate sort, and !α → φ and
?α→ φ express use once and use many obligations, respectively. For example
the policy Each time a nurse gives drug to a patient, agent c can bill that
patient is written as:(
isNurse(x) ∧ isPatient(y))→ (!giveDrug(x, y, c) → mayBill(c, y))
Use-once obligations require special care, in the distributed setting we are
considering, to ensure that they are used only to justify a single action [4].
The owns predicate models ownership of data, which gives the permission to
derive any policy concerning this data, including the permission to delegate
permissions about it to other agents. The connectives ∧,→ and ∀ are treated
as usual. The says construct is a special connective used to express the per-
mission to delegate policies. For example, the policy Any doctor can delegate
to a nurse, the treatment of his patient. is written as
∀x, y, z.(isDoctorOf(x, y) ∧ isNurse(z))→ x says mayTreat(z, y) to z.
Our logic allows to derive permissions from a set of actions. We refer
to earlier work for a more complete description of the underlying derivation
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system [5]. Here it is important to be aware of the fact that when an agent a
can derive (b says φ to a) then a can also derive φ.
Logging and Accountability
In the Audit Logic, similarly to what happens in proof-carrying code frame-
works [2,17], when an action of an agent is audited, by an auditor, the agent
has to present a justification proof for it. The agent may use (part of) its log
as evidence in the justification proof.
For example, consider the two actions executed by agents a and b in Fig-
ure 1: In step (1) agent a communicates the policy φ to agent b and agent b
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Fig. 1. An overview of the architecture. Agents execute actions and keep logs in
order to respond to a possible audit later on. Dotted arrows denote interactions
with an auditor. In the picture φ denotes the policy mayRead(b, d).
logs this communication (2), for later. Agent b reads data d (3) and at some
moment (4) the Auditing Authority finds this action in some audit trail, in
this case the log of queries executed at some database. The auditor decides to
ask agent b for justification (5). Agent b justifies, and uses the logged evidence
(in step 2) of agent a’s policy communication. The auditing authority now
asks agent a for a justification of having said φ to b.
A formal proof system, denoted ` is used to derive justification proofs from
evidences in the log. Informally, an agent a can justify an action α from an
excerpt ² of its log, by proving that
² `a φ(α)
where φ is the proof-obligation for the action α. For example, suppose that
the proof-obligation for the action read(a, d) is the formula mayRead(a, d),
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then to justify the action read(a, d) to an auditor, agent a has to supply a
proof of ² `a mayRead(a, d). This proof can then be checked by the auditor.
Here we are not interested in specifying how auditors collect evidence and
which actions should be audited by the auditors [13]. More details regarding
proof-obligations can be found in [4].
Framework Tools
In the event of an audit, an agent needs to find justification proofs based on
its log. This involves reasoning about possibly complex policies and actions,
hence we need a theorem prover. Moreover, a tool is needed for the auditors
to check the justification proofs; this is an automatic proof checker.
The tool architecture for finding and checking proofs are depicted in the
Figure below. For reasons of safety and efficiency both tools are implemented
separately using different systems [5]: The proof checker uses Twelf, the proof
finder uses SWI Prolog.
Assume that an agent a has
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performed an action α and that
the auditing authority wants a
to justify α. First, (1) agent a
is audited for action α. Agent
a now selects an excerpt ² of
its log and a policy φ that is
a’s proof obligation for action
α and (2) tries to find a proof
of ² `a φ using the proof finder.
Then (3) the proof pi and the
excerpt ² are sent to the audi-
tor for checking (4) and finally, (5) the auditor checks that pi is indeed a proof
of ² `a φ by using the proof checker (6). The syntax of the proofs can be seen
in Figure 4.
3 Case Study
To show how the Audit Logic can be used in an EHR setting, we describe a
specific scenario involving health records and medical personnel.
Medical records need to be processed and accessed by numerous systems
in different places. To protect the patient’s privacy and the privacy of medical
personnel, users can specify policies that describe who can access the medical
record and under which circumstances. In the sequel, we ignore the issues of
moving the medical record from one system to the other, instead we focus on
the policies that accompany the medical record.
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Setup
The agents involved here are patients, doctors, nurses and administrative
employees; the users of the EHR system. The data consists of the medical
records and the actions we consider are reading a medical record, updating
a medical record, administering medicines and billing a patient for them (cf.
Section 2).
The form of the medical records we consider is inspired by the legal di-
rectives on privacy of health records [15,16]. A medical record is divided into
two parts: first, the personal information, PI, records all non-medical informa-
tion related to the patient, like billing information, and information regarding
the patient’s family members (which may have medical records of their own).
Second, the medical data (MD) gathers all the medical information of the
patient, like diagnoses and given prescriptions. Updates to the medical record
are performed by appending new information together with the name of the
agent making the update.
Additionally, several auditors have the mandate of controlling that the
medical records are used appropriately, i.e. the hospital’s internal auditor,
a government authority and a patient union representative. Independently,
these auditors may audit different sections of the organization.
The hospital has defined a general policy, φh, to protect the privacy of
patients and allows medical personnel to access and handle the necessary
health information:
H1 A patient may read and update the PI section of his medical record and
authorize others to do so;
H2 A patient may read and update the MD section of his medical record and
authorize others to do so;
H3 A doctor may read the PI section of the medical records of his patients;
H4 A doctor may read and update the MD section of the medical record of
his patients;
H5 A doctor may give medicines to his patients;
H6 A doctor can delegate to a nurse on his staff the administering of medicines;
H7 An administration employee may bill a patient each time someone has
given medicines to that patient;
In Figure 2 the hospital’s policy is formalized using the policy grammar (see
Section 2).
Additional customized policies may be added later to this general policy
by the individual users, for example explicit patient consent given to medical
staff. Users may send policies to each other by using email.
Note that in this setting whatever is not explicitly mentioned in a pol-
icy, is not permitted, and that each policy added entails more permissions
(monotonicity). A special mechanism would be required to model explicit
prohibitions, basically to ensure the proper propagation of these prohibitions
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H1 ∀a, d.(isPatient(a) ∧ isPI(a, d))→ owns(a, d).
H2 ∀a, d.(isPatient(a) ∧ isMD(a, d))→ owns(a, d).
H3 ∀a, b.(isDoctorOf(b, a) ∧ isPI(a, d))→ mayRead(b, d).
H4 ∀a, b.(isDoctorOf(b, a) ∧ isMD(a, d))→ (mayRead(b, d) ∧mayUpdate(b, d)).
H5 ∀a, b, c.isDoctorOf(b, a)→ mayGiveDrug(b, a, c)
H6 ∀a, b, c, d.(isDoctorOf(b, a) ∧ onStaffOf(c, b))→ b says mayGiveDrug(c, a, d) to c.
H7 ∀a, b, c, d.isAdministration(c)→ (!giveDrug(b, a, d)→ mayBill(c, a, d)).
Fig. 2. The hospital’s policy written in the Audit Logic’s policy language.
in a distributed setting. For an example of such a mechanism we refer to the
revocation mechanism of SPKI/SDSI.
Scenario
Let us instantiate the general setting to a concrete instance. We have
patients Alice and Bob, doctors David and Diana, a nurse Natalie and an
administrative employee called Charlie. Alice trusts doctor David to give her
medical file to other doctors, in case other doctors need to read it, say to get
a second opinion. Alice’s policy φa is in words: Dr. David can delegate the
permission to read the MD section of Alice’s medical record. It is formalized
as follows:
∀b, d (isMD(alice, d) ∧ isDoctor(b))→ david says mayRead(b, d) to b.
Alice’s policy, hence, is more specific than the rules in the hospital’s policy. The
hospital’s policy states that only (H4) Alice’s doctor may read her medical file. Alice
now gives the permission to David, to give read permission also to other doctors.
Note that this last
Let us see a sequence of actions performed by these users. We have formalized
these actions in an appendix.
A1 The hospital gives its policy to Dr. David.
A2 Dr. David logs this for later.
A3 Alice becomes patient of Dr. David.
A4 Dr. David logs this for later.
A5 Alice meets Dr. David in his office.
A6 Dr. David reads the PI section of Alice’s record, to remind himself of Alice’s
personal details.
A7 Alice communicates her new policy φa to Dr. David.
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A8 Dr. David logs this communication for later.
A9 Dr. David updates the MD section of Alice’s record.
Note that Dr. David logs the events A1, A3 and A8, because the evidence of
these events may be useful for him later on. For example, Dr. David can use A8
later on to prove that he was allowed to show Alice’s file to another doctor. The
auditors on the other hand may keep an independent (e.g. random) track of actions,
so-called audit trails. In particular, the hospital’s privacy officer routinely monitors
the queries to a database with medical records, both to detect anomalous behavior
and to ensure that the hospital’s policy is adhered to. The emails between Dr. David
and patient Alice, possibly containing policies are not monitored by the hospital’s
privacy officer. They may become known to him only because some user uses
the policy communication in some justification proof. Independently, an external
auditor controls the financial accountability of the hospital, i.e. to ensure that not
too many costs are billed to patients.
After some time, the hospital’s privacy officer asks Dr. David for a justification
for having accessed Alice’s file. To give a justification Dr. David needs to show to
the auditor the log entries corresponding to A2 and A4 from the sequence above,
and a proof that:
[A2, A4] `david mayRead(david, alice).
David’s proof is automatically checked and the auditor finds that David is account-
able.
Now, unexpectedly, Alice arrives injured at the hospital, while Dr, David is off
duty. Dr. Diana who is on a shift with nurse Natalie, treats Alice upon arrival:
B1 Dr. Diana logs that Natalie is a nurse on his shift.
Informally Alice asks for treatment.
B2 Dr. Diana reads the MD section of Alice’s medical record.
B3 Dr. Diana updates the MD section of Alice’s record.
Informally Dr. Diana tells nurse Natalie to give Alice the medicine Qurol.
B4 Natalie administers the medicine.
B5 Natalie notifies billing that Qurol was given to Alice.
B6 Charlie logs this for later.
B7 Charlie bills Alice for the medicine.
B8 Charlie logs this, together with a reference to Natalie’s notification.
The actions in this sequence are shown in Figure 3 and formalized in the appendix.
Note that both Diana and Natalie operated initially without proper authorizations.
Alice’s assertion that she is/consents to being Diana’s patient was missing. More-
over, Natalie should have had Diana’s explicit authorization to administer Qurol.
Say half an hour later, when Alice is a bit better, she authorizes Diana, and,
say when the shift is over, Diana authorizes Natalie:
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Fig. 3. The sequence of actions involving the patient Alice, where ”auth. Q”
denotes Dr. Diana’s authorization for nurse Natalie to give the medicine Qurol, and
”consent” denotes Alice’s explicit consent to being treated by Dr. Diana.
B9 Alice becomes patient of Dr. Diana.
B10 Dr. Diana logs this for later.
B11 Dr. Diana tells nurse Natalie to give Alice the medicine Qurol.
B12 Natalie logs this for later.
Note that the medical staff first treats Alice and then records the necessary details
for administration and accountability. Although initially not all the authorizations
were available, a-posteriori, the operators can account for their actions. For exam-
ple, when Alice is asked to account for giving Qurol to Alice, she can send the log
entry corresponding to item B11 above, together with a proof of
[B12] `natalie mayGiveDrug(natalie, alice, qurol).
To illustrate a more complex proof, Diana’s proof for the delegation to Natalie
(B11 above) is more involved. To account for it, Diana has to prove that:
[H5, B1, B9] `Diana Diana says mayGiveDrug(natalie, alice, qurol) to alice.
The actual proof involves a number of steps. Diana can use his proof finder to
generate the exact proof for him. In Figure 4 we sketch the proof. The auditor
can check this proof automatically, using the proof checker. We refer the interested
reader to earlier work for details about the implementation of the tools [5].
Finally, to illustrate the use of use-once obligations, the next day Natalie gives
another dose of Qurol, in line with what Dr. Diana told her.
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[H5] 
isDoctorOf(diana, alice) ∧ isStaffOf(natalie, diana)
→ diana says mayGiveDrug(natalie, alice, qurol) to c.
∀e
[B1] [B9]
isDoctorOf(diana, alice) ∧ isStaffOf(natalie, diana)
∧i
diana says mayGiveDrug(natalie, alice, qurol) to natalie
→ e
Fig. 4. A sketch of an accountability proof.
C1 Natalie administers the medicine.
C2 Natalie notifies billing that Qurol was given to Alice.
C3 Charlie logs this for later.
C4 Charlie bills Alice for the medicine.
C5 Charlie logs this, together with a reference to Natalie’s notification (C3).
Notice that the policy (H7) allowing Charlie to bill Alice for the medicines contains
a use-once obligation (cf. Section 2): Each time someone gives drugs to Alice,
Charlie can add to Alice’s bill. Charlie needs to log the billing action, together with
a reference to the corresponding notification by Alice [4]. In other words, when
billing Alice, Charlie has to state, in his log, to which notification it belongs. This
allows the external auditor, described earlier, to check that each item on the bill
corresponds to a dose of Qurol administered by Natalie.
4 Discussion
The case-study shows how a-posteriori access control can be used in the EHR set-
ting. In this section we elaborate on the main advantages and the main drawbacks
of this approach.
A-posteriori versus a-priori
The advantage of a-posteriori access control allows the medical staff to go ahead
with their duties, without worrying about problems like expiration of certificates,
passwords or failing network connectivity to some authorization server. These issues
can be dealt with at a more convenient time. By definition a preventive access
control system does not provide this kind of flexibility. Only certain useful events
or performed actions have to be logged instantly by the medical staff, for the purpose
of accountability. By keeping logs of such events and actions, doctors and nurses can
account to multiple auditors that come at different times. In a traditional a-priori
access control system, on the other hand, the authorizations are only checked once
by a single authority, i.e. at the moment access is requested.
A-posteriori access control has a characteristic drawback: it does not prevent
misbehavior, hence it does not give the robust security guarantees that are required
in e.g. military information systems. In many settings, a-posteriori access control
can not replace preventive access control at all because the costs of incidental misuse
are much higher than the costs of a (too) preventive security mechanism.
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Many countries have adopted legislation that describes rather explicitly the re-
quirements for EHR systems [15,16]. Consider for example the summary of the US
act HIPAA [16]. The principal rule is as follows:
A covered entity may not use or disclose protected health information, except either:
(1) as the Privacy Rule permits or requires; or (2) as the individual who is the sub-
ject of the information authorizes in writing. 4
The HIPAA act stresses that patients have the right to justifications of past disclo-
sures of their medical records. In HIPAA it is called Disclosure Accounting, being
the subject’s right to get an accounting of disclosures of its EHR in the past six
years.
The a-posteriori access control mechanism, described in this paper, provides
a formal definition of this accounting and the tools to automate such accounting.
Although not required in the HIPAA act, automation is convenient to be able to
run audit tools without human supervision, enhancing both the privacy and the
efficiency of the audits.
Finally, about the implementation of the law, the HIPAA act states that The
Privacy Rule does not require that every risk of an incidental use or disclosure of
protected health information be eliminated. Therefore, the main drawback of our
approach, i.e. that with a-posteriori access control we can not completely exclude
misuse, is in principle allowed for by the law.
Infrastructure
We outline the requirements with respect to the underlying infrastructure.
Actions are executed at the session layer. Here authentication and non-repudiation
is required, to be able to determine which users were responsible for which actions.
Once an action is executed, the evidence of its occurrence should be safely stored
for later, this is called an audit trail. Also, time-stamping of actions is required, to
be able to demonstrate that an action was not executed before another, or before
a required policy was received. Audit trails should provide auditors with a tran-
script of all (or most) user actions, to detect misbehavior. Consider the example
in Figure 1. Here, a database system provides a secure log of past queries to some
auditor. On the other hand, the policy communications between the two agents
are ignored by the auditor. For example, the users may be using some private
email system to communicate (signed) authorizations. The auditors do not moni-
tor these exchanges. Additionally, besides using the logging facilities of electronic
systems such as databases and computers, audit trails can also be established us-
ing cameras, key-loggers, RFID sensors, database query logs, etc. The audit trails
need protection from tampering [13], but this is already required for accounting and
security purposes [9].
Moving up to the application layer, the main requirement here is the presence
of a secure device for users to log the actions and events useful to them. Moreover,
both auditors and user may use the tools shown in Section 2 to find and check
accountability proofs automatically. These evidences are used by the users in the
event of an audit. For example, suppose a doctor changes a medical file and a policy
4 This was also illustrated in the scenario; patient Alice gave extra permissions to her
doctor David.
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states that in that case the corresponding patient should be notified. To justify his
actions later on, he should log the action of notifying the patient. The notification
is executed at the session layer, where it may be caught in an audit trail. At the
same time the logging device must create a tuple containing the logged action, its
time-stamp and possibly other parameters, which can be used as evidence in an
audit later on [4]. To prevent that users forge their logs, some secure device is
needed that takes care of this logging.
At the application layer, audit-based access control has little impact, which
makes it rather suitable to implement across different institutions, where many
different kinds of legacy systems are used. For example, the databases schemas of
the involved organizations can remain the same and the ICT infrastructures would
not have to be re-designed from scratch.
Privacy and Trust
An important requirement for a-posteriori access control is that there must be
some mechanism in place to ensure that users can be held accountable for their
actions, i.e. that a user will not vanish after executing his (illegal) actions. This
is necessary for the trust of users in each other, and in the EHR system. In real
life, this is often done using a bail sum or by some legally binding agreement, such
as an employment contract. If this requirement is not met, malicious users can
perform actions and disappear before they can be held accountable. In our setting
this is particularly important, given the fact that users can give extra permissions
to others. A malicious user can set off a cascade of actions by other users.
A more complex aspect is trust management. We assumed for simplicity that
all users were equally trusted to utter security statements. However, consider the
case in which some unknown doctor made changes to the drug prescriptions for
Alice. Strictly speaking, Dr. David can trust another doctor, however, Dr. David’s
employer may require him to make a more complex trust decision that involves
checking the foreign doctor’s reputation and expertise area. Making such decisions
can be supported by using trust management (TM) systems [10]. On the one hand,
the TM system should give a full view of how users can be trusted, and on the
other hand, when an auditing authority finds that a user is not accountable, it
should report this to the TM system to decrease part the user’s reputation.
In practice, also in a-priori access control systems some authority checks the
system for flaws or abuse by logging and auditing user behavior. In fact this is
considered to be essential in conventional access control [12]. Often, these audits
are conducted without using formal or public procedures. In the auditing approach
we have removed the a-priori access control, and provided a formal and automated
auditing procedure. Automation allows for fast routine audits, and is more privacy-
friendly than auditing by hand. It remains a question if the user’s perception of
privacy is any different in either approach.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we show how the Audit Logic [4,7] can be used in the setting of
Electronic Health Records. We outlined the full architecture and we discussed the
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advantages and drawbacks of this approach, regarding ICT infrastructure and the
users’ privacy and trust.
We showed that our approach requires minimal changes to the infrastructure.
At the lower layers, secure audit trails, with all (or most) of the user actions, are
already required [9]. By minimizing the a-priori access control and relying on a-
posteriori access control we get a more flexible system to adapt to the medical
information flow. Yet the audit mechanism provides the necessary assurance, later
on, that the staff complied to the relevant policies. A-posteriori access control is
convenient when authorizations are not available on the moment that access to
medical files is needed. Moreover, as mentioned before, this type of auditing is
required by legislation concerning EHR systems [16]. In the Audit Logic framework
such audits are performed by a formal and automated auditing procedure.
In the EHR setting, privacy is an important issue for both patients and medical
staff. A-posteriori access control is in theory more intrusive to the user’s privacy
than a-priori access control. A-priori access control however is also coupled with
audits of logs and user actions [12,13]. An automatic audit procedure not only
enhances the privacy of the patients, but also that of the medical staff, wary perhaps
of human auditors that go through the logs by hand. Formal and public auditing
procedures make the privacy protection mechanism also more transparent to the
patients as well as to the medical staff. In the future we wish to investigate how
we can control the actions of the auditors in turn and how we can achieve maximal
privacy of the (honest) users with respect the auditors.
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A Appendix
For the sake of brevity, the two sequences of actions depicted in Section 3 are
formalized here.
The first sequence, where patient Alice visits Dr. David in his office:
A1 comm(hospital, david, φh).
A3 comm(alice, david, isDoctorOf(david, alice)).
A6 read(david,md alice).
A7 comm(alice, david, φa).
A9 update(david,md alice).
The second sequence, where Alice arrives, unexpectedly, in the hospital, while
Dr. Diana is on duty:
B1 comm(natalie, diana, isOnStaffOf(natalie, diana)).
B2 read(diana,md alice).
B3 update(diana,md alice).
B4 giveDrug(natalie, alice, qurol).
B5 notify(natalie, charlie, qurol, alice).
B7 bill(charlie, alice, qurol).
B9 comm(alice, diana, isDoctorOf(diana, alice)).
B11 comm(diana, natalie,mayGiveDrug(natalie, alice, qurol)).
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